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This research effort was undertaken to analyze the use
of Form, Fit, and Function as a second sourcing methodology
for major weapon systems. The major objectives of the re-
search were to determine what the main attributes of Form, Fit,
and Function were and how it could best be successfully employed.
The researcher found that Form, Fit, and Function would
most likely not be used for the reprocurement of entire
weapon systems. The real potential of this methodology was
in the procurement of components and subsystems. In this
regard, it can be used successfully for simple or technically
complex items, initial or follow-on buys, and as a means of
retrofitting existing equipments. Since there is no need
to transfer technical data between sources as in the other
second sourcing methodologies, Form, Fit, and Function can
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
Confronted with spiraling prices for both major weapon
systems and spare parts, the Department of Defense (DOD) is
turning more and more to competition as a means to get
control of these escalating costs. However, there are other
benefits of competition to be realized other than just cost
alone.
DOD is not increasing its use of competition solely be-
cause it is "good business practice," but also becasue of
the external pressures to aggressively seek competition for
its acquisitions. This external pressure comes mainly from
Congress through various avenues such as legislation and
program support. It is in DOD's interest that competition
for competition's sake not be solicited, but that competition
be sought when it makes sense and helps to meet the objectives
of the program. In seeking competition for a program, the
program manager has several acquisition strategies that he may
3
employ. The use of Form, Fit, and Function (F ) is one possi-
ble strategy which can be used for creating competition.
3
The F methodology is generally an approach which centers
around the use of a performance specification. There is
virtually no interface between competing sources and each con-
tractor must be capable to design and produce its own product.
Therefore, competitors are essentially competing on the grounds
of both design and price since each contractor is designing and
producing an item independent of detailed drawings. This re-
3search effort will review the use of F as a second sourcing
technique in greater detail as it is used in the acquisition
of major weapon systems.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The basic objective of this study was to discuss the use
of Form, Fit, and Function in establishing a second source
for acquisition purposes.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In support of the objective of this study, the major re-
search question was: What are the main attributes of the F
concept and how might this apporach best be successfully
employed as a second sourcing methodology?
In answering this question, the following subsidiary
questions were also considered:
3
1. What is the F concept?
3
2. How does F relate to other second sourcing methodologies?
3. What are the significant factors for its use?
4. What have been the significant issues or problems raised
with the second sourcing of sonobuoys and the Standard
Central Air Data Computer?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In writing this thesis, the information discussed and
analyzed was obtained from various sources. In addition to
searching currently available literature, both telephone and
personal interviews were conducted with both military and
civilian Government employees such as program managers and
contracting officers. Other individuals knowledgeable in
the acquisition arena were also interviewed.
The literature was compiled from references obtained
through Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)
,
DIALOG, Air Force Business Research Management Center, Lessons
Learned Program from the Air Force, DOD directives and instruc-
tions, and the Naval Postgraduate School.
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
3
This thesis will be centered on employing F as an acquisi-
tion strategy. In doing so, the other four methodologies will
3be briefly discussed so that the role of F can be better
analyzed. The thesis will include case studies of the acqui-
sition of Low Cost Sonobuoys and the Standard Central Air
Data Computer to see how and why program managers are currently
employing this methodology.
F. LIMITATIONS
This Study was necessarily limited in that the acquisition
of both the Low Cost Sonobuoys and the Standard Central Air
Data Computer are in the early phases of their program life
cycle. Therefore, an analysis of the effects of buying these




Throughout this thesis, it was assumed that the reader has
a basic understanding of the acquisition process and DOD
terminology, operation, and management structure.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter II
describes the major weapon system acquisition process, the
role of second sourcing, and competition. Chapter III is con-
cerned with defining the Form, Fit, and Function concept, its
attributes, and strengths and weaknesses of the methodology.
Chapter IV provides a review of two second sourcing models
available for the program manager, the Second Sourcing Method
3 3 . .Selection Model and the F /D Acquisition Decision Process
Model, and how they relate to the Form, Fit, and Function
technique. Case studies of two contrasting programs using
this methodology for establishing second sources are the topic
of Chapter V. Chapter VI provides conclusions and recommenda-
tions based on this research effort.
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II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
The acquisition of a major weapon system is a monumental
undertaking that requires considerable review and visibility
to ensure that Government funds are being wisely spent. As
larger and larger budgets are needed to procure these systems,
the overview by both internal and external sources becomes
much tighter. This necessitates that the Services do a better
job on the business side in fielding new weapon systems.
The acquisition process begins with the recognition of a
need to meet a new threat, perceived or real, or a new sys-
tem to meet an existing threat (see Appendix A) . This need
is then communicated to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
via the Justification for Major Systems New Start (JMSNS)
.
Based on this document, SECDEF either disapproves the initia-
tive or decides that there is a viable need to meet the threat
and gives his approval to go ahead with the program [Ref. 1:
p. 3-12]
.
At this point, a program manager is assigned and given
a Charter. The new program now officially moves into its
first of four acquisition phases, the Concept Exploration
phase. During the Concept Exploration phase, solicitations
are made from as many sources as possible, Government and
non-Government, and profit and non-profit organizations to
12
develop possible solutions as means to satisfying the need.
Additionally, in-house studies must be conducted in order
to establish some criteria by which to evaluate and test
proposals. These criteria must cover such areas as required
cost parameters,, performance, schedule, and supportability
,
i.e., program baselines [Ref. l:p. 3-13]. The program
manager must also begin developing an acquisition strategy.
The objective of the Concept Exploration phase is to
identify those alternatives which will meet the need so that
they can be further developed and evaluated in the following
phase. Along with looking at the functional and performance
capabilities, proposals should include estimated life cycle
cost (LCC) factors that will be used for evaluation and
selection purposes [Ref. 2:p. 9].
The major documents coming out of this phase are the
System Concept Paper (SCP) and the Test and Evaluation Master
Plan (TEMP) . Program Objective Memorandum (POM) input is
also critical at this stage in order to attempt to get funding
for the program. Upon review of the SCP, the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) makes a recommendation to
the SECDEF concerning further development. If the SECDEF,
or other Program Decision Authority (PDA) , approves the
system, it moves into Phase II, Demonstration and Validation.
During the Demonstration and Validation phase, contractors
who have shown plausible solutions to meeting the threat are
awarded contracts to prepare mock-ups and models or selected
13
systems. The contractors demonstrate how well they can meet
the criteria set forth in Milestone I. As stated above,
these criteria consist of such objectives and thresholds as
cost, schedule, performance, and supportability requirements
[Ref. lrp. 3-13]. These baseline characteristics are con-
tinually modified and updated throughout the life of the
system. If the SECDEF or PDA is assured that these requirements
have been or can be met, he prepares a Secretary of Defense
Decision Memorandum (SDDM) which indicates that the program
is ready for the third phase, Full-Scale Development. The
Full-Scale Development phase signifies that the final product
is being narrowed down and that only a few contractors are
still in the competitive range. The competitive range con-
sists of those contractors whose proposals are acceptable.
These few contractors then produce full scale versions of their
proposed systems to be tested and evaluated. This is an
extremely critical phase since the final decision to produce
will be based on prototypes and pilot production units
resulting from this phase. Also during this phase, more
accurate LCCs will be estimated, baseline configuration will
be set, technical data packages will be prepared, and the
overall suitability and producibility of the system will be
critically reviewed [Ref. l:p. 3-16].
Upon completion of reviewing and evaluating the alterna-
tives, the Services (or DSARC in certain cases) will make the
recommendation to go into production and the new system now
enters the final phase, Production and Deployment.
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It is in this phase that generally one contractor is
awarded a production contract and the program manager finds
his program in a sole source situation. Unless the program
manager takes decisive steps to avoid finding himself in
this position, the program could possibly be a sole source
contract for the remaining life of the contract [Ref. 3:
p. 15] . Second sourcing is a means to preclude this situation
from happening. The earlier in the acquisition process the
program manager considers second sourcing, the more effective
it will be when production is competed.
B. COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING
1. Definition of Competition
Webster's definition of competition is "the effort
of two or more parties to secure the custom of a third party
by the offer of the most favorable terms" [Ref. 4:p. 464].
Competition in the context of acquisition, as defined by a
proposed Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) instruction, is
the "solicitation of two or more sources for the delivery of
a suitable and acceptable product during the development,
production, and post production (support) phases of the
acquisition cycle" [Ref. 5:Encl (1)]. According to the
Federal Acquisition Regulations, full and open competition
means that "all responsible sources are permitted to
compete" [Ref. 6:para 6.003].
These are very broad guidelines for the program manager
to work by, but in fact, competition is becoming a much
15
broader concept. Increasingly, competition is becoming a
multi-dimensional national objective used by Congress and
the Services to consider price, quality, the industrial base,
and socio-economic programs in the acquisition of major
items [Ref. 7:pp. 2-9].
2 . Competition in Legislation and Regulation
The use of competitive procurement has been a main
tool of Congress since the inception of the United States to
help realize lower prices and forestall procurement abuses.
The first legislation specifically dealing with procurement
was the Procurement Act of 1809 [Ref. 7:pp. 2-3]. As a
result, formal advertising was to be used to enhance competi-
tion for goods and services utilized by the Federal Government.
However, due to the increasing complexity of systems and the
ever increasing volume of purchases, negotiated contracts
began to be used before the start of World War II [Ref. 7:
pp. 2-3]
.
Somewhat in response to this change in technique,
Congress passed the Armed Forces Procurement Act of 1947
which legitimatized the use of negotiation when any of seven-
teen "exceptions to competition" were applied [Ref. 7:pp. 2-3],
This law in no way attempted to replace or downplay the impor-
tance of competition, but took into account the fact that the
use of competition is not desirable nor possible in all
situations.
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As major weapon systems began to get more and more
costly, Government again became concerned with the acquisi-
tion process and issued two more guidelines regulating
competition. One was the Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-109, "Major System Acquisitions," in 1976 and
Congress' Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 19 84.
In 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci
submitted a memorandum to the various Service secretaries
entitled "Improving the Acquisition Process" [Ref. 7:pp. 2-4].
He identified 32 areas or initiatives to improve the major system
acquisition process. The last of those initiatives was to
"Increase Competition in Acquisition by Establishing Management
Programs and Setting Objectives."
Revisions to DOD Directive 5000.1, "Major Systems
Acquisition," and DOD Instruction 5000.2, "Major System
Acquisition Procedures," were made to reflect the initiatives
of Carlucci 's Memorandum and also OMB Circular A-109. These
two documents are key guidelines and directives used today.
In February 1984, the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) issued Policy Letter 84-2 entitled "Noncompeti-
tives Procurement Procedures" [Ref. 8:p. 1-3]. The focus of
this policy is to strictly limit the use of sole source pro-
curement and authorize its use only when one of seven exemptions
is used. Most recently, the Federal Acquisition Regulations
and its service and departmental supplements have been issued
in an attempt to standardize the procurement practices in
17
Government and to encompass the many new laws and regulations
regarding competition [Ref. 8:p. 1—4 J
.
3 . Design Competition vs. Production Competition
Design competition and production competition are two
distinct, independent concepts. Design competition is the
process of "generating alternative potential solutions to
satisfy a mission need, and the selection of the best system,
price, and other factors considered" [Ref. 9:pp. 17-18].
Production competition is a method of "obtaining competitive
offers from two or more independent, qualified manufacturers
for the production of identical, or functionally identical,
hardware or software" [Ref. 9:p. 18]. They are stressed at
different times during the acquisition process, handled
differently by Government and contractors, and have totally
different objectives and incentives. One should not be
considered better than another nor should one be considered
sufficient if used without the other.
Design competition is heavily concentrated in the
early phases of the major system acquisition process. The
program manager desires to stimulate as much competition as
possible during the Concept and Exploration phase to take
advantage of industry, Government, and non-profit institution
talents and resources in developing solutions to meet the
threat and to further develop promising solutions in the
Demonstration and Validation phase.
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The contractor goes into this form of competition with
the hope of winning an award to produce a weapon system. His
other incentive is that the contracting officer is generally
using a cost reimbursement contractual arrangement since
there are so many uncertainties and questions that flexibility
to changes is a must.
The major thrust of the contractor is still to receive
the production contract. In doing so, the contractor must
ensure that he is providing a proposal that is producible,
supportable, and affordable. According to former Deputy
Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan, Jr., the goal of
design competition "is to award the contract to the best
technical proposal within a realistic affordable price" [Ref.
9:p. 18]
.
Production competition occurs later in the acquisition
process during the Full-Scale Development and Production and
Deployment phases. It entails soliciting and obtaining pro-
posals from two or more competitive sources who are qualified
to produce identical or similar systems. Unlike design
competition which is concerned with "realistic" prices, pro-
duction competition is concerned with obtaining the lowest
"fair and reasonable" price for the system" [Ref. 9:p. 18].
The contractor's main incentive is now to make a profit by
producing the weapon system. The contracting officer usually
uses a fixed price-type contract to help stabilize the purchase
price since the program is often in a sole source position.
19
Price is not the only goal of production competition.
Two other goals are to enhance the defense industrial base
and to stimulate improvements in quality [Ref. 8:p- 1-11].
At times these goals may conflict but it is up to the program
manager to ensure that he is influencing competition to meet
the needs of his program [Ref. l:p. 4-7].
4 . Perfect Competition vs. Effective Competition
In addition to design and production competition,
competition can be defined as either perfect or effective.
Perfect competition is a condition whereby one buyer (or
seller) cannot effect the market price of the product to be
sold [Ref. 10:p. 298]. To have perfect competition, the market
must have effective competition. The reverse however, is not
true. Perfect competition is very rare and is almost non-
existent in the defense market. To have a perfect market,
there must be four characteristics present [Ref. 10 :p. 191].
a. There must be many buyers and sellers so that no
one buyer or seller has an influence on the market.
b. All of the sellers 1 products must be homogeneous.
c. Buyers and sellers are free to move into and out of
the market as they please.
d. Buyers and sellers have perfect knowledge of current
market prices and sellers have perfect knowledge of
costs.
The make-up of the defense market is such that none
of these characteristics can be fully met. However, the
program manager can exert enough influence on the market in
many cases so as to realize at least effective competition
20
for his program. The definition of effective competition is
that as a result of competition, the expected value of the
benefits realized exceed the expected value of the costs.
The value of the benefits and costs can be measured in both
monetary and nonmonetary terms [Ref. 9: p. 21]. Examples of
non-monetary benefits could be increased industrial base and
technical expertise.
The program manager must be careful when trying to
establish an effective market. Too many sellers could possibly
cause costs to exceed benefits if his program is funding
research or production capacity.
C. SECOND SOURCING
1. Definition of Second Sourcing
Many literature sources consider second sourcing and
competition syonymously. There are, however, significant
differences that should be brought out to avoid confusion and
maintain a distinction between the two terms. Second sources
are established to either maintain competition or increase
competition between two or more sellers or increase competi-
tion or to maintain an industrial base capable of supporting
the buyer's needs. The distinction is that competition re-
quires a second source whereas establishing a second source




Objectives of Second Sourcing
There are two basic second sourcing goals [Ref. 3:
pp. 18,19] :
a. the control and/or reduction of cost, and
b. the maintenance of an adequate industrial base.
However, there are several other objectives which
can be realized through second sourcing. They are:
a. lower acquisition price by using competition,
b. improve mobilization capability,
c. promote geographical dispersion so as to preclude
destruction of an only source due to natural disaster
or enemy attack and qualify new sources who possess
specialized technologies,
d. smooth out fluctuations in production for individual
firms caused by sole source awards,
e. needed Government controls are lessened due to the
presence of competition,
f. increase technical performance by increasing technical
or design competition,
g. more fully meet socio-economic goals by increasing
awards to minority and small/disadvantaged businesses,
and
h. increase ability to meet commitments of co-production
agreements for NATO programs.
3 The Roots of Second Sourcing
The concept of second sourcing goes back to just after
World War I. The Government funded the Chandler-Groves Company
to develop a floatless carburetor for aircraft engines.
Several attempts to get Stromberg-Carlson to design an accepta-
ble carburetor were unsuccessful since, for all intents and
22
purposes, Stromberg-Carlson had a monopoly on the market. As
a result of this bold step by the Government, Stromberg-Carlson
went to work and developed a pressurized carburetor which would
eventually be used in all United States military aircraft
in World War II [Ref. 12:p. 4].
During the Korean War, the Government felt that Boeing's
facilities were too limited to produce enough B-47 bombers to
satisfy the military's requirements. Therefore, both Douglas
Aircraft Company and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation were geared
up to produce them. Boeing provided all tooling, technical
data, components and parts [Ref. 12:p. 4].
Not until the late 1960 's was the concept of second
sourcing defined in the literature and regarded as a bonafide
means of increasing competition. Second sourcing has basically
evolved in four phases [Ref. 12:pp. 4-6]:
a. 1920 ' s--second sourcing was employed to stimulate
technological advances.
b. 1950' s—second sourcing was implemented to increase
production capacity where shortfalls were anticipated.
The second sourcing tactic of Leader-Follower had been
used before the term had even been coined. Mobiliza-
tion at the time of war was the driving force in
establishing additional sources of supply.
c. 1960 's— the establishment of second sourcing to inten-
sify competition was first defined. Second sourcing
was then seen as a viable tool for establishing compe-
tition to help control costs.
d. 1970' s to present
—
greatly increased cost cutting
efforts have expanded second sourcing 's role in
procurement strategy. Much research is being conducted
in this field. Second sourcing is now seen as a means
to reduce risk in the acquisition of major weapon
systems. Risk in this sense entails the three elements-
cost, schedule, and technical risk.
23
4. Barriers to Establishing a Second Source
If a program manager decides that second sourcing
would be beneficial for his program, he must investigate any
barriers which may preclude second sourcing. In looking at
possible barriers, there are four general areas which should
be considered iRef. 13:pp. 20-26]
.
The first is the process by which technology will be
transferred. This area frequently poses problems in estab-
lishing second sources. Some questions which arise are how
much it would cost if two firms had to work closely together
and the reliability and completeness of the available techni-
cal data package. If the manufacturing process is hard to
duplicate it may be very difficult and expensive to ensure
effective data transfer which is sufficient to support a
second source.
Secondly, the program manager must consider the char-
acteristics of the system. If a system is state-of-the-art,
other sources may be inhibited from investing in the capital
assets needed to perform the job. Also, the possibility of
requiring a long lead time to bring on line a second source
may not make it conducive to bringing on a new source. The
necessary security requirements for the system may also have
an influence.
Third, the characteristics of the acquisition process
may play a role in the decision to second source. Larger
quantities tend to be better candidates than small quantities,
24
especially if the original producer cannot keep up with demand.
Program stability and duration should also be heavily weighed.
Lastly, one of the most important considerations is
that of the characteristics of the contractors involved. A
contractor who wants to maintain his hold on a program may
be hard to motivate to help bring a competing source on line.





Once a program manager decides to stimulate competition
by developing a second source, he must decide how it should
be accomplished. There are five strategies currently identi-
fied which are being used and researched in order to establish
a second source. These methods are form, fit, and function;
technical data packages; leader-follower; directed licensing;
and contractor teaming [Ref. 14 :p. 13].
3
a. Form, Fit, and Function (F )
F is a second sourcing strategy that relies on
performance specifications and physical specifications such
as size, weight, mountings, and interfaces. Since there is
no need for communication between the sources, internal hard-
ware design flexibilities are expected and solicited. As a
result, a very hard look must be taken at a firm's research
and development assets as well as its production capabilities
during the source selection process
.
F lends itself to both inexpensive, simple com-
ponents and very expensive, complex items. It has been
25
successfully used in procurement for items ranging from con-
ventional ammunition to aircraft engines [Ref. 8:p. 9-11].
This particular methodology will be dealt with at length in
the following chapter.
b. Technical Data Packages (TDP)
TDP is a method of creating a second source by
means of transferring technology and design characteristics
without any interface between the developing firm and the
second source. This acquisition strategy has been used for
procurements ranging from the simplest of components to com-
plete missiles. The main concern of the program manager when
using this method is to ensure that the new source has ade-
quate production capability and facilities to handle the job.
All research and development efforts have already been completed
3
unlike the F method.
The major criteria for the TDP procurement is that
the data must be complete with all drawings, parts lists,
specifications, and in some cases, detailed description of
the manufacturing process. In some circumstances, the
developer is being requested to warrant the TDP that it sells
to the Government to ensure that it is complete and accurate.
Periodically, legal questions are raised concerning proprie-
tary data. Because of these problems, TDP is often very
expensive and hard to get.
Once the data is assembled and verified, however,
it can be used over and over again throughout the life of the
26
system or component. The advantages of using this strategy
are [Ref . 15:p. 14]
:
(1) Verified TDP should promote good competition and
result in a fairly easy procurement action.
(2) The design work is done at this point and companies
are now bidding on a production basis only, which
should open it up to more bidders.
Some disadvantages are [Ref. 13:p. 14]:
(1) TDP that is adequate to attract competition is very
expensive and occasionally hard to obtain which may
somewhat off-set any savings.
(2) When technical processes or methods are not spelled
out or readily accessible to other firms, the bidding
firms must have the technical capability to resolve
the problem.
(3) The program manager must start early in the develop-
ment stage getting the data packages assembled and
verified.
c. Leader-Follower
Leader-follower is very different from the pre-
viously discussed methods in that there is direct communica-
tion between the firms. The developer is tasked with furnish-
ing the technical know-how and assistance required to bring
the second source on line. This method is generally used for
large, complex components or systems. Leader-follower is
usually applied when the desired result is increased produc-
tion capacity [Ref. 14:p. 16].
FAR states that the leader-follower technique can
be implemented by one of three ways [Ref. 6:para 17.403]. One
is to state in the developer's contract that it is to sub-
contract a designated portion of the resuirements to a second
27
source. A second way is to award a contract to the developer
to bring a new source on line then contract with that new
source for some of the requirements. The third alternative
is to award a contract to a second source for the end item,
who will in turn contract with the developer to transfer the
technical data and knowledge required to manufacture the item.
The third method is questionable because the developer is
under no pressure to deal with the other source and has never
been used on military acquisitions because of this potential
problem [Ref. 8:p. 11-12].
The advantages of this method are [Ref. 15:p. 16]:
(1) Second sources can be established quickly and
efficiently.
(2) The Government has very little hands-on requirements
and responsibilities.
(3) Leader-follower has proven extremely successful when
it has been used.
The major drawback is that some companies do not
put their best effort into helping establish a competing firm




Directed-licensing is similar to leader-follower
in that the developer provides technical and manufacturing
data to a second source. The notable differences are that
the developer will receive royalties and he does not forfeit
proprietary data rights. The engine for the cruise missile
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is a recent case where directed licensing has been used
effectively [Ref. 16:p. 68].
Some advantages of this method are [Ref. 15:p. 15]:
(1) The developer is obligated to assist the second source
in setting up its production line through contractual
agreements delineated in the Full-Scale Development
contract.
(2) Since the developer is receiving royalties, it is more
likely that the developer will be cooperative in
getting the second source on line.
(3) The developer is allowed to select a possible second
source, with concurrence from the Government, which
removes a significant amount of work from the Government
(4) The Government can pass on much of the work of starting
up a new source with little effort and without the
expense of having to buy a TDP.
The disadvantages are [Ref. 15:p. 15]:
(1) The effect of competition could be negated if the
royalty fee offsets the savings.
(2) Some unscrupulous contractors may use it as a means
of getting access to another firm's trade secrets.
(3) It may be difficult to maintain configuration control
unless the firms' production lines are closely monitored
e. Contractor Teaming
Contractor teaming is a method that has found
recent success in complex systems where two contractors,
working in unison, each develop a part of the item and then
transfer the technology between themselves. Both firms must
be able to manufacture the complete item and then they are
qualified in that process concurrently. Once both teams
have qualified, they bid competitively for the production
contract.
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A key point of contractor teaming is that after a
team has been chosen and both qualify for production, there is
only one contract awarded. In making the award, there are
two routes that could be taken. One is that a prime con-
tractor could be chosen and in turn subcontract with the other
firm to produce a percentage of the items. A second alterna-
tive is that the two firms could form a joint venture to whom
the Government could award the contract. This is a split-buy
technique and is often used in the shipbuilding industry.
Some advantages to contractor teaming are [Ref. 14
p. 16] :
(1) Since two contractors are qualified, a second source
already exists when the contract is awarded.
(2) Since there are two firms working together to develop
the item, there should be a greater research effort
put forth thus minimizing proprietary data problems.
(3) There are no royalty fees holding the price arti-
ficially high.
(4) While honest competition is not really increased,
the industrial base is.
Disadvantages of contractor teaming are [Ref. 14:
p. 16] :
(1) Research and development costs may be initially high
since the Government must pay the burden of two firms.
(2) There must be open lines of communication between the
firms, and if a joint venture exists, the relationship
must remain solid.
D . SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to present a framework of
the competitive atmosphere in which today's program manager
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and contracting officer must function. It is also intended
to present the various second sourcing techniques to give the
reader a better perspective of how Form, Fit, and Function
relates to the other methodologies when reading the next
chapter.
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III. FORM, FIT, AND FUNCTION
A. DEFINITION
3
Form, Fit, and Function (F ) is a second sourcing tech-
nique used to develop competitive sources based on the per-
formance specifications and external interface requirements
3
of a system. The F method allows and encourages competing
sources to develop internally different systems as long as
the system satisfies the form, fit, and function parameters
set forth in the solicitation. These parameters may include
such characteristics as size, weight, external dimensions, power
requirements, and mounting provisions in addition to the per-
formance requirements. Thus, F is sometimes considered the
classical "black box" concept [Ref. 14:p. 13].
3
Since F acquisitions are based on functional specifica-
tions, the different manufacturers' systems are ones that are
functionally interchangeable but not logistically inter-
3
changeable. As a result, F has often been associated with
such simple, non-technically oriented components as the GAU-8
30-millimeter ammunition and the technically complex, but still
maintenance-free, sonobuoys [Ref. 8:p.2-4 and Ref. 17]. How-
3
ever, F has also been used to acquire such components as the
Alternate Fighter Engine and Standard Central Air Data Com-
3puter [Ref. 8:p. 9-1 and Ref. 18]. F has also been used to
purchase components which are repairable at the field level.
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but have demonstrated such high reliability that repair is
seldom necessary.
B. ELEMENTS AND ATTRIBUTES OF FORM, FIT, AND FUNCTION
1. General
3When properly planned and executed, F has proven to
be an extremely effective means of second sourcing as evi-
denced by such successful programs as the GAU-8 30-millimeter
ammunition and sonobuoy programs. However, because of logis-
3tic support problems inherent in an F acquisition, this
methodology will probably not be used to second source the
reprocurement of a complete weapon system [Ref. 19]. Its major
role is in the acquisition of the components within the system.
3Many of those interviewed considered F to be used as a means
of retrofitting a current system, while others believed it
could be successfully used at the front end of a major system
buy.
.
Regardless of when it is used, F allows a maximum of
flexibility for the user in selecting from proposed technolo-
3
gies [Ref. 20:p. 23.5.1], F also puts the risk of ensuring
that the equipment will perform as required in the hands of
industry by letting them drive the technology [Ref. 21].
3
F is often chosen over the other second sourcing
methodologies when technology is advancing so fast that it
would be impracticable to try to buy and maintain a TDP or
if the manufacturing process is so complex it becomes an
33
"art" which would make it nearly impossible to transfer the
3technology [Ref. 22]. F can also be effective if the pro-
gram manager has a bad design that he wants to correct [Ref.
3
2 3]. In this respect, F can be used roughly as a form of
value engineering. This point is brought out in the Air
Force's lessons learned data bank involving a parametric
amplifier which was experiencing poor reliability {Ref. 24:
Call Number 0521] . Taking advantage of a new state-of-the-
art signal mixer, a form, fit, and function replacement of
the ailing amplifier resulted in increased performance and
lower maintenance costs.
The program manager may find that this methodology
helps his program in other respects. If the program manager
wants to obtain a warranty for the equipment, he may get a
much more favorable response from the contractor if the con-
tractor is allowed to use his own design rather than build to
a predetermined design over which he has no control [Ref. 25]
Also, the program manager may find that his engineers are so
wrapped up in administrative details that they often become
ineffectual in maintaining and managing a TDP which requires
much effort on their part [Ref. 22]
.
2 . Dependency On The Original Supplier
Since there is no transfer of technology using this
second sourcing methodology, there is no dependency on a cur-
rent supplier to cooperate in developing a new source. This
attribute has occasionally resulted in this technique being
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employed when an uncooperative contractor refuses to assist in
establishing a second source. Competition for the cruise missile
3
engine was achieved by using F as a means to bypass the original
supplier [Ref. 8:p. 9-4].
One major attribute of F is that there is no need to
purchase a TDP to be used for later reprocurement unless the
3program manager has decided to use F for only the initial
buy and not for reprocurement purposes. TDP is very expensive
to buy and is often unusable for reprocurement purposes until
it is validated. This validation process can be long and
costly. Also, TDP must often be scrubbed of proprietary data
before other contractors can use it. TDP may also contain
unique production processes which precludes intercompany trans-
fer of technology [Ref. 24:p. 4], This protection of data
is one reason why contractors often prefer to manufacture to
a performance specification since they do not have to relin-
quish any proprietary data. In addition they can utilize their
own parts and suppliers.
3 . Relation To Competition
3 . .
Many sources consider F as a more truly competitive
means of acquiring equipment over the other methods. The
reason for this is that there is competition over design as
well as price. The other methods rely either directly 'or
indirectly on the transference of detailed data which strictly
dictates a given design so that competition is based primarily
on price. The drawback is that by using an F approach, the
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program manager may be limiting the number of perspective
competitors since design and technical capabilities in addi-
tion to production capabilities are a must.
This concept is also in keeping with the Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-109, Major Systems Acquisi-
tions, which stipulates that equipment needs should be stated
in terms of mission needs, capability, cost objectives, and
operating constraints [Ref . 27] . This allows the contractor
to inject his own ideas and technology into the system. The
contractor is not tied down to a single production process
which he may or may not be able to duplicate.
This use of industry's technical capabilities helps
to maintain not only the industrial base for production capa-
bilities, but may also help to finance the technical expertise
needed to keep pushing the state-of-the-art by funding several
research and development (R&D) efforts. However, in helping
3
to maintain this capability by using F to instill competition,
the program manager must be willing to incur some extra costs.
These costs of competition include the cost of requalification
of contractors, increased R&D expenses, logistics support
requirements, and possibly increased administrative costs.
The program manager should also be sensitive to the
3fact that the use of F can be counterproductive to competition
if not properly controlled. For example, if there were changes
that needed to be made to the system, one contractor could
become non-competitive if he had to make drastic changes to
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his product whereas another contractor did not have to make
such changes because they used different technologies [Ref.
327]. Also, the F package should not restrict competition
due to arbitrarily derived specifications which favor one
contractor over another [Ref. 20:p. 23.5.2].
4
. Logistic Support
Logistic support problems are considered by many to
3be the biggest single drawback to using F [Ref. 17] . For
this reason, most applications are for those equipments which
are expendable and not going to be repaired. More and more
buys, however, are being made for equipments which are going
to be maintained, but not at the shipboard level. In these
cases, the equipment could be removed and replaced at the
shipboard level but repaired at the depot level. This repair
may be done by the contractor [Ref. 17].
Logistic support problems center around the fact that
there is no configuration control over the internal make-up
of the equipment [Ref. ll:p. 5-2]. If the equipment is to
be repaired, repair data, personnel training, and spare
parts for multiple equipments would have to be acquired. It
is possible that there could even be several variations from
the same source. Therefore, the level of maintenance must
be set early in the acquisition cycle before the second sourcing
technique is determined [Ref. ll:p. 4-1].
3
In order to realize the benefits of F for repairable
type items, program managers are turning to the manufacturer
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for repair [Ref . 17] . This is being accomplished through
either fixed type contracts or warranties. The program
manager must be careful in this endeavor not to end up in a
sole source situation because of the method used to repair
the equipment.
5. Form, Fit, and Function Specifications
3
One of the major attractions of the F concept is that
performance specifications on a whole are much easier to
write than design specifications [Ref. 21]. In addition,
industry often helps to develop these specifications through
standards [Ref. 28]. This is a widely used technique in the
aviation industry and is currently being used in conjunction
with the military to develop standardized avionic packaging
concepts [Ref. 20:p. 23.5.4],
According to MIL-STD-885B, there are two basic kinds
of procurement data packages referred to as form, fit, and
function packages. One is for the competitive procurement of
interchangeable items. It must include sufficient data to
"enable the procurement of the same item from the original
manufacturer, or the competitive procurement of a functionally
and physically interchangeable item from other sources"
[Ref. 29:p. 5]
.
The second procurement data package refers to an item
existing in the market on an unrestricted basis. These are
either off-the-shelf items or ones that are procurable from
a specialized segment of industry. Suggested sources for
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these items are normally identified in the package. [Ref.
29:p. 5]
There are some pitfalls with the use of performance
specifications if due care is not taken. One problem is
that engineers may not know what parameters are important
or how some components may affect others [Ref. 19]. Examples
of this are the C-130 Power Brake Control Valve and the MC-2A
Air Compressor [Ref. 24:Call Number 0495]. These particular
items have been plagued by performance problems due to poorly
written performance specifications which did not control
significant characteristics of the items.
This is particularly true if the system is untried and
still in the development stage. During the development of
the A-10 aircraft, the decision was made to forego a full-
scale mockup since design was considered stable. This resulted
in expensive modifications having to be made because form, fit,
and some mechanical function parameters could not be verified
without the mockup [Ref. 24:Call Number 0497].
If the system is extremely complex, there may be too
many interfaces to describe them accurately enough to produce
a clear specification [Ref. 30]. Because mechanical applica-
tions have interfaces which are hard to describe in a perfor-
3 ...
mance specification,' most F acquisitions are for equipments
in the electronic field where there are more industry standards
employed.
With the use of performance specifications, the
program manager tends to lose control of the configuration of
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his system [Ref . 23] . It is difficult to monitor and control
the contractor in these situations, but Government engineers
need to be completely aware of all the contractor's actions




This chapter analyzed the second sourcing technique of
Form, Fit, and Function. The viewpoints of several Government
employees active in the major weapon system acquisition process
and various literature sources were compiled to determine what
3
the F concept is and how it can best be used. The following
chapter will discuss two second sourcing models and how they
apply the F methodology.
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IV. CURRENT SECOND SOURCING MODELS
A. PREFACE
In conducting research for this thesis, two second
sourcing models were identified that are available for the
program manager to use. The intent of this chapter is to
3discuss these two models, address how they relate to F , and
compare their strengths and weaknesses. These models are the
Second Sourcing Method Selection Model (SSMSM) developed by
two students at the Naval Postgraduate School and the F /D
Acquisition Decision Process developed by the Naval Avionics
Center (NAC) for the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) . These
models are presented in Appendices B and C respectively.
B. SECOND SOURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL
1. The Model
The objective of the SSMSM is to "provide a logical
and systematic framework for evaluating the applicability of
each of the competitive methods in light of variables presented
in the acquisition situation" [Ref. 14:p. 18]. The outcome
is to select the second sourcing method which best fits the
needs of the program or at least to distinguish those tech-
niques which should be eliminated from further consideration.
The SSMSM is broken down into two distinct acquisition
situations, pre-production and post-production. Each of these
models are significant because the variables should be viewed
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differently depending upon when in the acquisition cycle the
decision to second source is made.
The SSMSM is based on a heuristic overview of fourteen
different variables. Being heuristic, the model does not
attempt to assign numerical values to the variables, but simply
rates the effectiveness of each of the variables according to
the circumstances. The Air Force is currently attempting to
adapt this model to use quantitative factors vice heuristic
values [Ref . 28]
.
2 . The Variables
The fourteen variables and how they relate to the model
are described in Appendix B^ How these variables relate to
3
F in particular, are addressed in this section [Ref. 14:
pp. 16-21]
.
a. Quantity to be Procured
The total quantity and rate of purchase can greatly
affect whether or not it is cost effective to second source an
item. If quantities are too low or buys stretched out, the
development of a second source may be costly. However, the
Government may well pay the differential if the goal is in-
creased mobilization.
While no second sourcing method is particularly
3
attractice when low volumes are being sought, F may be pre-
3
ferred over the other techniques. This is because F is rela-
tively simple to use and the fact that there is no expensive
TDP to purchase and validate.
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b. Duration of the Production
As quantity impacts on the second sourcing decision,
so to does the production duration. The shorter the production
time, the less likely second sourcing serves as a viable means
to instill competition into the program. F is generally less
effected than the other methods because there is no dependency
of one contractor on another. Each competitor is constrained
only by his own technical abilities.
c. Learning Curve
The steeper the learning curve, the less effective
second sourcing will be. This is due to the fact that the
original producer will be able to realize an unfair advantage
since he will be farther down the curve. It is the researcher's
observation that during the pre-production phase, unless one
3
of the competitors is the prime contractor, F may negate any
advantage of one competitor over another since they are not
competing with the same TDP. Since they are using their own
design and production processes, it is likely that they are not
even using similar learning curves [Ref. 27]. Learning curves
would have a larger impact on the post-production buys since
one or more contractors is already in a production mode.
d. Technical Complexity
According to the SSMSM, the more complex the sys-
tem, the more there needs to be an interface between the com-
3
petitors. Hence, F is best used when the complexity is lower.
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3Unless parallel development has occurred, F may be very hard
to implement [Ref. 31:p. 12].
e. State-of-the-Art
Increased contractor interface is essential as the
program moves toward the leading edge of technology. As with
3technical complexity, F becomes a viable alternative as the
technology increases due to the uncertainty of the interfaces.
Also, as the technology increases, fewer and fewer contractors
have the capability to design and develop the components.
f. Other Applications
Second sourcing would be greatly beneficial to a
program if the system has other applications, both governmental
3
and commercial. F is exceptionally good to use in these cases
Commercial products may be used which helps to control costs
and standardization. Also, if an item has commercial applica-
tions, the contractor may not want to divulge trade secrets.
3Because F relies on a performance specification, the contrac-
tor may not want to have to provide TDP since there is no
transfer of data.
g. Privately Funded Research and Development
The amount of privately funded R&D could be a
3factor in determining whether to use F . If the R&D require-
ments were too high, regardless of whether funded privately or
by the Government, competition may become severely restrained.
3
On the other hand, one of the benefits of F is the discovery
of new technologies. As long as this R&D effort is funded
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privately rather than through the Government, R&D should be
encouraged. This is particularly true if the equipment would
have other applications.
h. Unique Tooling
As the need for unique tooling increases, the
chances of second sourcing paying off diminishes for all
techniques. F may be effected the least since the contrac-
tors might be able to develop new production techniques or
methods which would preclude the need for special tooling they
do not now have.
i. Cost of Transferring Unique Government-Owned
Tooling
The cost of transferring Government-owned tooling
weighs evenly among the second sourcing methodologies regard-
less of the cost level and thus has a negligible effect on
3
which methodology is chosen. However, F may have a slight
advantage if the contractor proposes a system designed around
his current capabilities.
j . Production Capacity of the Original Developer
When the original contractor lacks the capability
to manufacture the needed quantities because of constrained
capacity, it may become mandatory to establish a second source
If the original producer has excess capacity, it may be more




The maintenance concept which will be used is an
essential element in the determination of the methodology to
be used. If the system requires field level maintenance, the
3
use of F could severely limit the supportability of the sys-
tem since there may or may not be any commonality between the
components. The only exception to this is if the component
has demonstrated such a high level of reliability that little
or no maintenance is required [Ref. 31:p. 12].
1. Production Lead Time
The longer the time it takes to bring on a second
source, the less positive effect second sourcing has on the
acquisition process. This holds true for all methodologies.
3
F is especially sensitive to this for post-production buys
since each contractor has to engineer, produce, and qualify
his product.
m. Degree of Subcontracting
As the amount of required subcontracting increases,
there is less benefit derived from second sourcing. This is
particularly true if only a few subcontractors have the capa-
bility to do the job forcing the prime contractors to compete
3for their services. F would be less susceptible to this poten-
tial problem since the prime contractors may be using differ-
ent components to build their systems because they are using
a different technology base.
46
n. Contractual Complexity
The more complex the contractual arrangements
become between the Government and the contractor, the more
difficult it becomes to create a second source. As require-
ments for life cycle cost parameters, warranties, and other
arrangements are made, the problems compound as additional
3
sources are added. F would have less problems regarding con-
tractual complexities than the other methods simply because there
is no need for interaction between the competing sources which
in itself increases the administrative workload.
3 , 3
C. F /D ACQUISITION DECISION PROCESS
1. The Model
3 3
The F /D Acquisition Decision Process developed by NAC
is a four stage deterministic model used to decide which
approach should be exercised to develop a second source: the
3 3
F approach or the detailed design disclosure (D ) approach.
The four stages are [Ref . 31 :p. 3-1]
:
a. Stage 1 is a review of the characteristics and situa-
tions surrounding the program to determine whether or
not the program is ready for competition.
b. Stage 2 presents a decision model to determine whether
an F^ or D^ acquisition approach should be used.
c. Stage 3 presents two additional models to use to de-
cide upon a particular strategy once an approach has
been selected.
d. Stage 4 offers a set of application guidelines that




Definitions are offered to clarify the model.
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3
a. F Acquisition Approach [Ref. 11 :p. 5-1]
3
The F approach is based on the use of the Govern-
ment's functional specification that describes the equip-
ment to the Weapon Replaceable Assembly (WRA) level.
In addition to system partitioning, the specification
describes the equipment's size, weight, external
configuration interfaces, mounting provisions, type of
power and performance characteristics. Equipments
designed and manufactured by different contractors will
meet the functional specification and will be inter-
changeable at the WRA level, however, each contractor
will exercise a freedom of internal design. Consequently,
each contractor's equipment will be functionally but not
logistically interchangeable. There is minimal, if any,
technology transfer between the contractors.
3
b. D Acquisition Approach [Ref. 11 :p. 5-1]
3
In the D approach the FSD contractor has designed
an equipment to meet the Government's performance speci-
fication and produces a technical data package which
documents his design in accordance with certain Military
Standards and Specifications. This approach permits pro-
duction contractors, other than the developer, to manufac-
ture identical equipments. Equipment manufactured by
competitive production sources will be interchangeable at
the WRA, SRA, and piece parts level (that is, functionally
and logistically interchangeable) . The required technology
transfer may take on a wide range' of options as to how the
design data, manufacturing processes, and documentation
are provided to competing production contractors. The
most sophisticated technology transfer would be via a set
of "stand alone" instructions, which represents the highest
order of data package development.
3
c. F Acquisition Strategies [Ref. ll:p. 6-1]:
3Once the decision to use F as a means of second
sourcing is made, the program manager must decide how to
implement it. There are two possible routes. One is through
industry sponsored developments where commercially developed
products are used, and the second approach is through Govern-
ment sponsored development whereby performance specifications
are released for contractors to design and develop components.
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3 ...d. D Acquisition Strategy [Ref. ll:p. 6-1]
According to NAC, there are six possible strate-
3gies based on the D approach. These various strategies are




Production competition is not always easy to establish,
Prior to FSD and Milestone II, the program manager must ensure
that his program is ready to proceed into the next acquisition
phase. The following is a list of those requirements which
must be met before proceeding [Ref. ll:p. 4-1]:
a. Major design risks must either be resolved or else
plans made to resolve them.
b. Firm and realistic performance, cost, and schedule
goals must be set.
c. A maintenance concept must be selected.
d. A test and evaluation plan must be set.
e. Adequate funding must be approved and budgeted.
f. System performance requirements must be updated.
g. Limited or pilot production requirements must be
established.
h. The acquisition plan must be firmed up.
i. "Fall back" options and alternatives must be identified
and reviewed.
The program manager must also ensure that a baseline
is established [Ref. ll:p. 4-2]:
a. Engineering development and testing must be done.
b. A limited number of units should be produced for test
and evaluation.
c. A Configuration Management Plan should be implemented.
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d. An Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Plan should
be developed.
e. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) should be
updated.
f. Technical and operational evaluations should be
conducted.
g. Production approval should be obtained.
h. The program manager should ensure that there are
competitive sources available for his system.
It is also the program manager's responsibility to
determine whether or not his program is ready for competition.
In making this decision, there are seven characteristics which
must be considered and action taken to correct any deficien-
cies. These characteristics are evaluated through a series of
questions [Ref. ll:pp. 4-2— 4-5].
a. Market Research— "Has market research identified suffi-
cient industry interest to establish competition?"
b. Technology Availability— "Is the technology planned
for the equipment design available as an accepted
industry production process?" If the program manager
wishes to apply F^ to a system which is at the leading
edge of technology, he may find it difficult to get
enough contractors interested who have the resources
to design, develop, and produce the system.
c. Stability of Performance Requirements— "Are the per-
formance requirements expected to remain stable after
initial production?" For F^ applications, changes
to the system require negotiations with each contractor
and their products must be either partially or totally
requalified. These changes could have a significant
effect on one contractor and not on the other since they
have incorporated different technologies into their
products
.
d. Budgeting for Competition— "Is adequate 'front end'
funding available to establish competition?" The use of
F^ requires that adequate funding be available to cover
non-recurring costs for tooling, test equipment, R&D,
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and qualification. If there are insufficient research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds avail-
able, the D-3 approach may have to be used. However,
if significant quantities are involved, contractors may
be encouraged to use their own independent research and
development (IR&D) funds.
e. Time/Schedule Constraints— "Is there sufficient time in
the schedule to establish production competition to
realize a return-on-investment?" Since the F^ tech-
nique requires each contractor to develop his own
equipment, the program manager must have a feel for
industry's capabilities in his field in order to make
rational decisions on how much lead time is needed.
f. Character of Support Resources— "Is there adequate
technical support and funding available to implement
production competition?"
g. Return-On-Investment (ROI)--"Is a return-on-investment
anticipated?"
Lastly, the program manager must make the decision as
to whether or not his program is ready for competition. Based
on the above factors, the program manager should be able to
identify any shortcomings or possible problems and take action
to rectify them before proceeding into FSD.
4 . Stage 2—Selecting an Acquisition Approach
3 3
The F /D Decision Model is based on the comparisons
3 3
made between F and D (Appendix C) . To use this model, the
following assumptions must be made [Ref . 11 :p. 5-3]
:
a. Prior to FSD, the production competition decision will
be made.
b. Sufficient funding is available.
3
c. Configuration control of D equipments is maintained
by the Government.
d. Prior to using this decision model, a maintenance
concept must be chosen.
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This model is set up like a flow chart. It asks the
program manager several questions which will lead him to the
3 3
optimum acquisition approach (F of D ) . These questions are
[Ref . ll:pp. 5-3— 5-8] :
a. Maintenance Concept— "What is the target maintenance
concept for the equipment?" And "is the intermediate
level Maintenance afloat?" If maintenance is to be
conducted by mobile or afloat units, the use of F-^
would be inappropriate since maintenance/supportability
would be extremely difficult and expensive unless the
reliability was very high.
b. Commercial Developments— "Are there at least two sources
of off-the-shelf or modified commercial equipment avail-
able that meet the system requirement?" And "can life-
time supportability/availability of the equipment be
assured?" If commercial equipments are obtained through
F^ specifications, the program manager must ensure that
the contractor will support the equipment throughout
its life or else provide adequate technical data so
that parts can be obtained from other sources
.
c. Funding— "Are sufficient funds available to qualify two
or more sources?" If two or more competitive sources
are to be established for production purposes, adequate
funding must be readily available to support development
and qualification costs.
d. Performance Specification— "Can a comprehensive perfor-
mance specification be developed to the Weapons Re-
placeable Assembly (WRA) level with a high degree of
confidence?" To ensure interchangeability of equipments,
all F^ development and production specifications must
be well defined, at least to the WRA level. If these
interfaces cannot be defined in adequate detail, F^ may
not be the right approach to use.
5. Stage 3--Selecting an Acquisition Strategy
Once the program manager has chosen an approach, he must
decide what strategy to use. To assist the program manager
3in making this decision, NAC's model uses two aids, the F
3
and the D Competitive Acquisition Strategy Decision Models.
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If the program manager decided to use a D approach, he could
select from among six alternatives. They are [Ref. 11:
p. 6-1]
:




b. Government Lead Strategies
(1) Performance Specification/Model/Available Data
(2) Independently Validated Data Package
(3) Joint Industry-Government Validated Data Package
Should the program manager decide to apply the F
approach, there are basically only two variations or strate-
gies that are open to him [Ref. ll:pp. 6-2— 6-3]:
a. Industry Sponsored Developments—Under this strategy, the
Government utilizes commercially developed equipments.
The program manager thereby avoids data rights problems
and R&D costs. In theory, this makes good business
sense, but the contractor must make certain that the
contractor will support the equipment throughout its
life and that competition is maintained.
b. Government Sponsored Development— If the Government
can specify its requirements in sufficient detail
based on the operational needs, physical description,
and necessary interfaces, and adequately fund and R&D
effort, this strategy can be extremely effective. Once
the contractors are qualified, competition should be
keen.
3
In using the F Competitive Acquisition Strategy Model,
the program manager must have some knowledge of the market to
derive the appropriate strategy. Basically, if the commercial
off-the-shelf equipment can be used, or slightly modified for
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Government use, and two or more sources who can be motivated
to produce the equipment, then the industry sponsored develop-
ment strategy should be used. On the other hand, if there is
no commercial product that can do the job nor contractors willing
to fund the development costs and the time frame is critical,
then the Government should sponsor the development.
6 . Stage 4—Acquisition Strategy Application Guidelines
Now that the program manager has decided on the acqui-
sition strategy, he must minimize the risk to his program by
successfully implementing that strategy. The guidelines are
rules to follow in order to [Ref. 15:p. 20]:
a. not be caught in a sole source position, and
b. ensure that there will be support throughout the life
of the equipment.
D. HOW THE MODELS RELATE TO FORM, FIT, AND FUNCTION
3 3Both the SSMSM and the F /D Acquisition Decision Process
model may lead a program manager to the same conclusion as to
3
whether or not to use F in his acquisition strategy. They
also force a program manager to take a hard look at his program
to see where it stands and where it is headed.
The whole of the SSMSM relates to F essentially the same
3 3
as do Stages 1 and 2 of the F /D Acquisition Decision Process
model. Several of the same topics are brought up in both
models such as maintenance concepts, funding, and lead times.
From there the models change considerably. The SSMSM
leaves the decision making up to the program manager based on
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3 3the heuristic values applied. The F /D Acquisition Decision
Process model goes on to identify two variations of the F
approach, as discussed in Section C of this chapter. NAC '
s
model then concludes by offering some guidelines to apply in
3
the application of F .
E . SUMMARY
The intent of this chapter was to expose the reader to
two current second sourcing selection models and relate them
3 3
to the F concept to determine how they approach the F as a
means to second source an item. The following chapter reviews
two programs which were second sourced using F as an acquisi-
tion strategy.
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V. A REVIEW OF FORM, FIT, AND FUNCTION APPLICATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the F
approach has been used in actual applications and to discuss
why it was chosen over the other second sourcing applications.
The programs reviewed were the Low Cost Sonobuoys and the
Standard Central Air Data Computer.
A. LOW COST SONOBUOYS
1. General
Low Cost Sonobuoys (LCS) are just one element of the
low cost sonobuoy system (LCSS) . The complete system consists
of the LCSs, sonobuoy launch containers, avionics for P-3
and S-3 aircraft, sonobuoy launchers, and advanced broadband
sensor development. The purpose of the system is to provide
effective, economical airborne antisubmarine warfare detection
against existing and future submarine threats. Unless other-
wise referenced, the material in this section was based on the
acquisition strategies for LCS.
2
.
Program Background and Acquisition History
In 1983, a Request for Proposal (RFP) was released
which stipulated that there would be a two-phased R&D effort
involved for the development of the sonobuoys. In September
1983, six offerors were awarded firm fixed-price (FFP) con-
tracts, based on their technical approach, granting them a
three month design study effort (Phase I) . Phase II was
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to result in a twenty-one month exploratory development effort
and was eventually awarded to two of the six original offerors.
For this effort, cost plus reimbursement type (CPFF) contracts
with a 50/50 share on cost overruns were used for the fabrica-
tion, delivery, test, and evaluation of 250 complete LCSs from
each source. The Phase II contracts were awarded to Sippican
Ocean Systems, Inc. and Spartan Corporation.





d. contractor experience/facilities/management, and
e. development cost realism/reasonableness.
Along with LCS contracts, both Sippican and Spartan
were given cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts to develop
shipping-launching containers based on a performance specifica-
tion designed around their versions of the LCS. These containers
were not competitively awarded since it is customary that the
company manufacturing the sonobuoy, also manufacture the con-
tainer. In addition, competitively awarding the container at
this time would add unnecessary risk and time delay to the
program.
Delivery of the LCSs is planned to increase in a gradual
manner from 20,000 units to 500,000 units over a period of three
years. The proposed delivery schedule is as follows:
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Pilot Production LCSs 3rd Qtr FY-86— 2nd Qtr FY-87
20,000 (10,000 each contractor)
Production LCSs 3rd Qtr FY-87— 2nd Qtr FY-88
100,000 (50,000 each contractor)
Production LCSs 3rd Qtr FY-88— 2nd Qtr FY-89
500,000 (one or two contractors)
Based on the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board's
(CEB) decision of 21 March 1985, both Sippican and Spartan
began pilot production. Under the fixed-price incentive (FPI)
type contract, the assembly of the LCSs required that a semi-
automated facility be used. Both manufacturers were required
by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) to become fully automated.
The purpose of this was to achieve a low unit cost and a high
level of reliability [Ref . 32] . These units were to be used
for technical and operational testing and to ensure an early
introduction into the fleet.
3 . Acquisition Strategy
LCSs were designed to be non-maintainable, non-
repairable, expendable items for which no spare parts or
maintenance test facilities were required. Because of this
maintenance philosophy, the LCS acquisition is based on a
performance specification.
There were two secondary reasons for using a perfor-
. . . 3
mance specification, or F approach, in this situation. One
was to take advantage of innovative design developments to
achieve cost reductions. A related point was that the tech-
nology in this field had been changing so rapidly that manu-
facturers were altering the configuration of their sonobuoys
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approximately every three years as long as there were no
changes to the performance specification [Ref. 33]. This fact
would make the purchase of a technical data package very
uneconomical
.
3The second reason for using F was that the need to
introduce the LCS into fleet use was of utmost importance and
waiting for further technological advances was not an option.
3By using F to realize later performance and capability improve-
ments as developments continued, the program manager was not
faced with upfront schedule versus cost or performance trade-offs
The decision to second source was made in order to ensure
an adequate industrial base would be present to meet surge and
mobilization requirements. Peacetime needs were expected to
average one-half million LCSs per year. A split-buy award
method was used with a larger share going to the lowest bidder.
Only two contractors were awarded contracts for pilot production
units since it was deemed that more than two sources would be
inefficient, particularly since the overall system concept was
not yet fully validated.
In support of this purchase, Level II engineering draw-
ings would be purchased in accordance with MIL-D-10 00. Since
3
F was utilized, perceivably throughout the life of the LCS
program, Level III drawings did not have to be purchased for
later reprocurement use. The Level II drawings were to be used
for lot acceptance and production surveillance purposes.
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4.
Benefits of the Program
In reviewing the LCS program, the researcher con-
sidered the following benefits to be important to the
program [Ref . 32]
:
a. The LCS program has met its goal so far in ensuring that
an adequate industrial base exists. The benefit of
reduced price has also been realized because of the
competitive nature of the program.
b. There have been no problems to date with the program.
This may be partly due to the fact that sonobuoys have
historically been purchased via a performance specifi-
cation and never with a design specification.
c. As contractors get their automated production lines
operational, quality and price should both improve.
5 Analysis of the Form, Fit, and Function Application
In analyzing the LCS acquisition, it becomes evident
3that the LCS program is a classical application of the F
methodology. To begin, there was a substantial amount of
interest by industry in the program which is important to
any second sourcing effort. Much of this interest was created
by the long duration of the program and large quantities of
LCSs required to incentivise contractors to expend IR&D funds
and be willing to invest in tooling and production facilities.
The technical complexity of the sonobuoys was such
that, though the LSCs were state-of-the-art, there were no
complex interfaces with which the contractor had to be con-
cerned. Additionally, there was no need to transfer data
between contractors since each manufacturer had to build from
his own design.
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One of the goals of the program was to field the system
as soon as possible, then let technical advances increase the
3performance of the sonobuoys as the program matured. The F
technique was ideal in this situation since it allowed for
continued technological advancements but also allowed the system
to be fielded using the technology currently available. If the
procurement would have been made using a design specification,
the design would have had to have been frozen, otherwise the
cost of buying a technical data package and validating it would
be a wasted expense.
Of prime importance was the maintenance concept which
was selected. For the LCS program, there was to be no main-
tenance conducted on the sonobuoys at any level which precluded
requirements for spare parts and support facilities. There-
fore, there was no concern over the internal configuration of
the LCSs and the contractors could incorporate any design or
technology into the LCSs which was compatible with their
engineering and production capabilities. This in turn could
help to achieve lower prices if the contractors were using
their own proven methods and facilities to produce the item.
In the procurement of any system or component, a good
specification is essential to ensure that what was ordered was
what was required and received. In the case of the LCSs, the
use of a performance specification was wise because good speci-
fications could be prepared. The interfaces were relatively
simple and could be easily documented. In addition, the purchase
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of sonobuoys had always been made under performance specifica-
tions. Because of this past experience, the Government
engineers could safely ensure that the specifications they
prepared would be complete and accurate.
B. STANDARD CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER
1 . General
The Standard Central Air Data Computer (SCADC) is a
new state-of-the-art, solid state air data computer. It is
to be used as a retrofit for the currently installed systems
aboard several airframes in the Navy and Air Force arsenals.
The current systems are electromechanical analog devices which
have exhibited low reliability and costly maintenance charac-
teristics. Because of the outdated technology of the present
systems, spare parts and production line support are waning.
This is a joint Navy/Air Force program for which the
Air Force is the lead agency. The SCADCs are to be used on
both tactical and non-tactical aircraft within both Services.
Because there are several air frames involved, there were
several different configurations of the SCADC developed to
meet the required form, fit, and function parameters.
One standardization feature of these computers is the
use of a common core module which includes the power supply,
microprocessor, memory, and transducers [Ref. 34]. The core
accounts for approximately 88% of the hardware commonality
between the various configurations of each contractor [Ref.
34J , Another standardization feature is that of compatible
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software [Ref. 35]. Unless otherwise referenced, the material
in this section was based on the acquisition strategy for the
SCADC
.
2 . Program Background and Acquisition History
The development of the SCADC was to be designed around
a form, fit, and function specification which would allow it
to be applied to several weapon systems and still realize
life cycle cost (LCC) benefits of standardization. The objec-
tive of the program was to replace the older air data computers
with a new state-of-the-art model. The SCADC was expected to
improve performance in addition to improving reliability, main-
tainability, and interoperability. Total LCC management was
an integral part of the program and all changes requested by
the contractors required trade-off studies be made to assess
LCC impacts.
In April 19 81, a RFP for development was issued and
contracts were awarded to two companies in September 19 81.
The two companies were Garrett AiResearch Manufacturing Com-
pany of Torrance, California and Marconi Avionics Limited
(now General Electric Corporation) of Kent, England.
The risk factors concerning the SCADC were generally
low. Since the technology currently existed, technical risk
was seen to be low. General Electric Corporation (GEC) had
already completed the required Reliability Qualification Testing
(RQT) and Garrett was expected to qualify prior to the con-
tract award for production. Cost risk was also low since the
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field was very competitive and each contractor had already
built 108 units from which to draw accurate cost data.
Schedule and manufacturing risk were also considered low since
production techniques were already proven. However, schedule
risk could slip to moderate if Garrett could not pass RQT
prior to production award date.
The reason for this possible slippage was that Garrett
was experiencing quality problems. Garrett had received an
unfavorable result on a Quality System Review which gave them
a moderate risk for quality assurance. GEC was still regarded
as having a low quality assurance risk since they had already
passed QRT.
Purchase of the various configurations was expected
to be spread over several years as follows:
Basic Option Option Option Option Option
FY-85 FY-85 FY-86 FY-86 FY-88 FY-89
Air Force 574 518 1015 971 150 79
Navy 298 49 426 355
Options
(AF/Navy) 197 228 640 688 522
Totals 872 764 1669 1966 838 601
Total Programmed Req'uirements 4,425 $202. 0M
Total Optiona 1 Planning (AF/Navy) 2,275 94. 6M
6,710 $296. 6M
Source selection was based on an overall assessment
of technical, life cycle cost, and management considerations
The assessment of management included a review of the risk
factor for not having completed the RQT.
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Both Services decided that a two-level maintenance
concept was the most cost effective method of maintenance for
these units. The units were to be covered for three years
under the contractor's warranty after which time the Services
would assume organic repair at the depot level. Even though
GEC planned to build their products in England, repair would
be effected at their plant in Georgia [Ref . 18] . Interestingly,
the SCADC units had been designed to accommodate intermedi-
ate level maintenance as well as organizational and depot level
by using built-in-test (BIT) capabilities which allowed
fault isolation down to the systems replaceable assembly (SRA)
or module level [Ref. 34]
.
On 21 June 1985, the production award was made [Ref.
36] . It was expected that these two companies would be the
only competitors for the production contracts due to schedule
constraints. It was also anticipated that there would be a
split award to both Garrett and GEC for production of the
SCADCs. Even though Garrett had not yet qualified due to
reliability and quality problems, it was felt that they could
be qualified [Ref. 36]. However, when the Source Selection
Authority (SSA) made the final decision, only GEC was awarded
a contract. His decision was based primarily on price since
there was a considerable difference between the two competitors
[Ref. 36] .
The program is currently in a sole source position.
Level III drawings for reprocurement will be purchased.
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However, Garrett may yet become qualified and reprocurement
3
using F for future follow-on purchases has not been ruled





The best acquisition strategy for the procurement of the
3SCADC was determined to be F for two reasons. One is that
the efforts and knowledge of industry could be applied to the
program [Ref. 36]. Secondly, since the focus of the program
was to retrofit existing airframes, there was no TDP available
to use as a source document. The contractors were therefore
required to do the development and they assumed the risk of
ensuring that their products met the specifications in the
solicitation package [Ref. 18].
The purpose of the second sourcing effort for SCADC
was to try to reduce price [Ref. 36] . As stated above, LCC
considerations were very important for this program. This
consideration came up repeatedly throughout both the acquisi-
tion strategy and from personal interviews.
4 Benefits of the Program
In reviewing the SCADC program, the researcher con-
sidered the following benefits important:
a. Even though a split buy was possible, and even antici-
pated, organic repair was to be used at the depot
level. It had been determined that the extra expense
of supporting two different manufacturer's products
would be overcome by the competition over price and
also the fact that there were no major differences in
the construction of the different variations. [Ref. 18]
b. Substantial cost savings were in fact realized.
[Ref. 37]
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c. The performance specifications used for the acquisi-
tion were well-prepared. There were a few minor
modifications made to the equipments being retrofitted
that required changes to the specifications, however
the modifications were slight and easily resolved.
[Ref. 36]
5. Analysis of the Form, Fit, and Function Application
In analyzing the SCADC program, there were many
3significant differences in the application of the F second
sourcing methodology between this program and the LCS program.
While a large number of SCADCs were being procured in the
first year, there was no guarantee that large sales in the
follow-on years would materialize even though the options'
indicated that they could. This point could have a negative
impact on the number of competitors who would be willing to
expend IR&D funds to even submit a proposal.
The major difference between the two programs centers
around the adopted maintenance concept. Essentially, the
SCADC was a repairable item while the LCS was a maintenance-
free, expendable item. Once the contractor's three year
warranty expired, repair was to transfer to organic facili-
ties. Both Services decided to use a two echelon maintenance
plan since it was conceivable that several configurations of
the SCADC might have to be supported. Because of multiple
configurations, repair parts, test equipment, repair data, and
personnel training would be needed to support the maintenance
plan. This is somewhat in conflict with the idea that if an
item is to be repaired organically, then the configurations
should be identical, i.e., buy with a design specification vice
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a performance specification. However, in this case, the
Services decided that the dollars saved from competition
would more than offset the added support costs.
This carries over into another important point. The
decision had been made that once these computers were initially
purchased, follow-on buys would be made using a technical data
package approach so that later SCADCs would be identical to the
original ones, regardless of who would build them. This will
result in purchasing and validating the data packages so that
the technology can be transferred to other sources.
Because two different manufacturers were awarded con-
tracts to develop their computers, they would both have to be
qualified. This was good in that it puts the burden on the
contractor to qualify his product and not on the Government to
provide adequate design specifications. However, much effort
has gone into trying to qualify the one contractor with no
success. Even though the goal of reducing price had been
achieved, the program was put into a sole source position
until either the other contractor becomes qualified, reprocure-
ment data is made available for use in solicitations, or another
contractor could produce the item using the performance
specifications
.
Since the interface for the SCADCs are much more complex
than the LCSs, great care had to be taken to ensure that all
of the interfaces had been properly identified and accurately
described. The Government engineers were aided in that they
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were dealing with fairly stable airframes and were aware of
the interfaces. A potential problem did arise when there were
some modifications made to the equipment with which the SCADCs
would interface. Fortunately, the modifications were slight
and the contractors could respond easily. The problem could
have had a substantial impact on one or both of the contractors
if major changes to the computer would have been necessitated
because of the particular design or technology used.
C . SUMMARY
This chapter presented two case studies of purchases
using Form, Fit, and Function as an acquisition strategy and
3
analyzed how they fit into the F concept. Both cases have
so far realized their goals even though they are still in the
early stages of their life cycles. They have also demonstrated
that Form, Fit, and Function can be a viable alternative in
the second sourcing decision.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this chapter, the researcher presents several conclusions
and recommendations based on this research effort. While the
reader may or may not agree with all of these conclusions and
recommendations, the researcher believes that the general
opinions of the major system acquisition community are properly
expressed.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Based on this study of Form, Fit, and Function, the follow-
ing conclusions were drawn:
Conclusion #1. Form, Fit, and Function will most likely
never be used as a second sourcing methodology for an entire
major weapon system for reprocurement purposes .
The consensus of those interviewed expressed the viewpoint
3
that F is not an appropriate methodology for second sourcing
an entire major weapon system once an initial procurement has
been made. This concept was discussed in the elements and
attributes section of Chapter III. Because of the additional
3
costs of using F for acquisition purposes, uncertain develop-
ment lead time, and particularly, logistic support problems,
3
F lends itself more readily to the procurement of the com-
ponents of a system rather than the complex system itself.
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Conclusion #2. The major determination regarding the
3
viability of F as a second sourcing methodology centers
around the selected maintenance concept .
A major concern for any weapon system is the supporta-
3bility of the system once it is fielded. Since F , by
design, encourages different internal configurations of a
component, supportability by afloat and field units would
3become more difficult and costly should F be used. This
problem is more actue in the Navy which relies more heavily
on three levels of maintenance than the Air Force which is
relying more and more on two levels of maintenance.
Conclusion #3. In order for performance specifications
to be useful in a Form, Fit, and Function application, the
design of the system and interface requirements should be
fairly firm.
As discussed in Chapters III and IV, the design of the
system should be fairly stable in order for performance
specifications to be properly prepared. Physical and inter-
face requirements are critical to an F acquisition and must
therefore be relatively certain. Changes can be made to per-
formance specifications, however there is a chance that some
contractors may become noncompetitive if the technology or
design which they are using is not compatible with the change.
Conclusion #4. Form, Fit, and Function can be an ex -
tremely capable and effective acquisition tool when the trans -
fer of technology between sources is not essential or possible
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3
F has several attributes that can make it extremely
attractive to a program manager when the transfer of
technology is not required. As discussed throughout Chapter
3
III, the features of F are such that:
3
a. F can allow a program manager to get around data
rights problems.
b. It can also be a means of working around an uncooper-
ative contractor.
c. Since each contractor is responsible for both design
and production, much of the risk is taken off the
Government and placed on the contractor.
d. If the intent of the program manager is to continue to
use F^ for the reprocurement of the item, both design
and production competition may be able to be realized
throughout the life of the item.
e. Since the contractor may be utilizing his own design
and production capabilities, he may be able to operate
more efficiently and thus realize a lower cost than if
he had to manufacture to a design specification.
f. The production process used by a contractor may be
unique to that contractor and may not be able to be
duplicated by another contractor. In this case, F^
could be used to get other sources of supply when the
transfer of technology is not possible.
Conclusion #5. Good performance specifications are essen-
tial to the successful application of the Form, Fit, and
Function methodology .
The quality and completeness of the specification must
be excellent if the procurement is to be a successful one.
As discussed in the performance specification section of
3 3Chapter III and in the F /D Acquisition Decision Process
model in Chapter IV, an adequate specification-is of utmost
importance. The end product will be only as good as the
specifications to which it was designed.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
3 3Recommendation #1. The F /D Acquisition Decision
Process should be expanded to include post production buys .
Post production is a very important area that needs to be
addressed. With the continued emphasis on competition for
price and quality, and problems with a shrinking industrial
base, this area should not be neglected. NAC should take
the lead and proceed to develop this model to include this
very important area.
Recommendation #2. Program managers must plan early in
the acquisition cycle in order for a Form, Fit, and Function
second sourcing strategy to be effective.
Program success relies heavily on early program manager
planning if multiple sources are to be used to meet estab-
lished goals for the system. A sufficient budget must be
3
available for supporting an F second sourcing effort to
cover such additional expenses as development costs and
contractor qualification costs for more than one contractor.
The program manager must also ensure that adequate time is
allotted to give the contractors sufficient time to research
and develop their products. Program managers should ensure
3
that, if F is to be used, necessary measures are taken early
in the acquisition cycle to allow time for budgeting to be
programmed and design development to be accomplished.
Recommendation #4. Program managers should ensure that
the maintenance concept to be used is firmly decided before
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the decision to use Form, Fit, and Function as a second
sourcing methodology is made .
The desired level of maintenance is a critical element in
. . 3determining whether or not F is a viable second sourcing
methodology. There is a direct correlation between the
level of maintenance and the amount of supportability that a
given weapon system will require. Because of this, program
managers should ensure that they have a set maintenance policy
3prior to using F . They should also ensure that the decision
3
.
to use F is consistent with that particular maintenance
policy.
Recommendation #5. The program manager should ensure that
the design and interface requirements of the system are stable
before performance specifications are released for procure-
ment purposes .
Changing specifications can have an extremely detrimental
3
effect on procurements using F as the second sourcing
methodology. Design and development expenses can increase,
development times can multiply, and the uncertain effects that
it may cause the various competitors are potential problems
that may be associated with a change in the specifications.
Program managers should be aware of these possible problems
and strive to either freeze the design or at least limit
changes to only those that are absolutely required.
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C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the main attributes of the Form, Fit, and
Function concept ?
There were many attributes of F discussed in Chapters
II, III, and IV. The main attributes were:
a. It allows the user a maximum of flexibility in select-
ing from proposed technologies. As RADM Piatt stated,
it "leaves the option open to take a bargain."
[Ref. 32]
b. The risk of performance is in the hands of industry
vice the Government to ensure that the product can meet
the performance requirements set forth in the
solicitation.
c. Since there is no transfer of technology, the program
manager is not dependent upon the cooperation of the
original developer or technical data for reprocurement
purposes.
d. Overall, performance specifications are easier to
prepare than design specifications.
2
.
How might this approach be successfully employed as
a second sourcing methodology ?
3
F can be used successfully in the acquisition of both
simple, expendable items and extremely complex and highly
technical components. As noted in Chapter III, due to multi-
ple configurations inherent in the F approach, the acquisition
of entire major weapon systems on a whole may be precluded after
the initial buy. This may also hold true for components which
would require repair by afloat or mobile units.
3 What is the Form, Fit, and Function concept?
This question is fully addressed in Chapters II and III of
this thesis. F is essentially a second sourcing technique
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that requires a manufacturer to design and build his own
product rather than build to a preestablished design. The
sources are, therefore, building to a performance specification
rather than a design specification.
4
.
How does Form, Fit, and Function relate to the other
methodologies?
As discussed in Chapter III, F is a more truly competitive
second sourcing methodology than the other methodologies because
it pits one contractor against another based on both design
3
and production competition. The F technique is totally differ-
ent from the other methods because there is no transfer of
technology between competing firms. Each produce is redesigned
based on the individual contractors' engineering and production
capabilities. Also, unlike the other methodologies, there is
no control over the internal configuration of each product.
This results in these items being functionally, but not
logistically , interchangeable. These differences become
3 3
readily apparent when using the F /D Acquisition Decision
Process model discussed in Chapter IV.
5 What are the significant factors for the use of
Form, Fit, and Function?
As discussed in Chapter III, there are two major decisions
3
which must be made before the determination to use F should
be made. One is that the maintenance plan must be set. If
the maintenance plan calls for organizational level repair or
3intermediate level repair afloat, F may be inappropriate to
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use. Another significant factor is that a good performance




What have been the significant issues or problems
raised with the second sourcing of Low Cost Sonobuoys and
the Standard Central Air Data Computer ?
The sonobuoy program has been very successful in both
terms of increasing the industrial base and decreasing the
unit price. In order to remain competitive, the contractors
have kept improving the technology used. Changes to the
program have proven to be disruptive to the technical advance-
ments of the contractors.
The Standard Central Air Data Computer has been success-
ful in reducing unit cost. The major problem in the program
has been trying to get both contractors' computers qualified.
One contractor is still not qualified. Until both sources
can get certified, the' program is in a sole source position.
Another important fact was that it had been decided that it
would be cost effective to organically repair various configura-
tions of the SCADC rather than use contractor support.
D. AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH
Upon completion of this research effort, one area seems
to need additional research to be more fully addressed. This
area, which would be interesting to research, woulc be to
take the two models discussed in Chapter IV and apply them
to various programs already completed and some in the early
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stages of the acquisition process, to see how well the models
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APPENDIX B
SECOND SOURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL


































Low quantities make second sourcing difficult,
especially for technical data package.
Qualifying a second source takes time.
Licensing and leader- follower are particularly
unsuitable.
When steep learning is involved, any split of
production quantities will tend to increase
costs
.
The more complex the system, the more difficult
it is to second source. Contractor teaming
is especially effective in bringing complemen-
tary technologies together.
Similar to technical complexity.
If there are significant alternative uses for
the system, original producer will probably
create barriers to second sourcing.
Second sourcing success limited if critical
elements are proprietary.
Provides original producer strong competitive
advantage if costs are very high.
Equal weighting for all alternatives.
The more capacity the original producer has,
the less likely second sourcing can be
effective.
If second sourcing introduces variations in field
maintenance, its viability decreases.
80
Production The longer the lead time, the smaller the
Lead Time advantages of second sourcing.
Degree of If many subcontractors are involved, the
Subcontracting advantages of second sourcing are diluted.
Contractual The more complex the contractual relationship
Complexity with the original producer, the more barriers
there are to second sourcing.
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Fit- Data Directed Leader- Contractor
Function Package Licensing Follower Team
+ + + + +
+ + +
— ^
+ + + + +
+ + + +
X X
. .
+ + + + +
X + + +
+ - + + +
+ + + + +
X + + *
+ + + + +
+ + +
+ + + + +
X X _
+ + + +
Key:
+ = Strong applicability
- = Weak applicability
* = Particularly well suited
= Neutral applicability




Fit- Data Directed Leader- Contractor
Function Package Licensing Follower Team
Tooling Costs
High - - - - X

























+ = Strong applicability
-= Weak applicability
= Neutral applicability
x = Particularly inappropriate
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Fit- Data Directed Leader- Contractor
Function Package Licensing Follower Team
+ + + + +
+ +
X " " "
+ + + + +
+
X X X
+ + + + +
X + + *
+ - + + +
+ + + + +
X + + *
+ + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
X X
+ + + +
Key:
+ = Strong applicability
- = Vfeak applicability
* = Particularly well suited
= Neutral applicability




Fit- Data Directed Leader- Contractor
Function Package Licensing Follower Team
Tooling Costs
High - - - - X




Low + + + + +
Contractor Capacity
Excess - - - - -
Deficient + + + + +
Maintenance Requirement
Significant X
Minimal + + + + +
Production Lead Time
Long - - - - -
Short + + + + +
Degree of
Subcontracting
Heavy- - - - -
Light + + + + +
Contractor Complexity
Complex - - - - -
Simple + + + + +
Key:
+ = Strong applicability
- = Weak applicability
= Neutral applicability




F /D ACQUISITION DECISION PROCESS
1.1 RETURN ON
INVESTMENT?












































NO (SEE SECTION 7 .l.f)
TO F
3 /D 3 OECISION
COMPETITION/PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS (STAGE 1.0)
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3 3Comparative Summary of the F and D Acquisition Approaches
F Acquisition Approach
Form, Fit, and Function only
ensures interchangeability at
the WRA level. Internal con-
figurations may vary. WRAs





If compliance with the system/
WRA specification can be demon-
strated, the contractor is
authorized to make internal
design changes.
Contractor assumes responsi-
bility for adequacy of design
and production data.
Government buys maintenance
data only when organic
maintenance is planned.
The equipment specification
is validated through the con-





at the WRA, SRA, and piece part
levels. Internal configurations
are identical. WRAs and SRAs
are functionally and logis-
tically interchangeable.
Design competition between com-
peting FSD contractors is
encouraged but single source
development of equipment is
permissible
.
The contractor must obtain Navy
approval for all design changes.
Government retains configuration
control during full production.
Government assumes responsibility
for adequacy of design and
production data.
Government buys the Technical
Data Package (TDP) and the
data rights.
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IT COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION STRATEGY DECISION MODEL
START
WILL THE EQUIPMENT
USE A TECHNOLOGY OR
PRODUCTION TECHNIQUE
THAT IS VERY DIFFICULT








































































INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO OBTAIN MORE THAN ONE QUALIFIED
DESIGN/PRODUCER.
PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
FOR EACH WRA IN THE SYSTEM.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE DATA/DATA RIGHTS IN ALL FSD
AND PRODUCTION RFP * S
.
INCLUDE DATA/DATA RIGHTS OPTION (NOT-TO-EXCEED) IN SOURCE
SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
INCLUDE CLAUSE IN ALL CONTRACTS GUARANTEEING LIFETIME
SUPPORTABILITY/AVAILABILITY.
DEVELOP FALL-BACK STRATEGIES IN THE EVENT F PROGRAM




D 3 CONTRACTOR TEAMING
INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO DEVELOP AND FACILITIZE TWO OR
MORE PRODUCERS.
PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
STRUCTURE THE FSD RFP AND ESTABLISH SOURCE SELECTION
CRITERIA TO GUARANTEE THAT BOTH CONTRACTORS OF THE
SELECTED TEAM WILL EVENTUALLY BE CAPABLE OF INDEPENDENT
PRODUCTION.
SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE PLACING FSD CONTRACTS TO DETER-
MINE IF ANTITRUST PROBLEMS MIGHT EXIST.
PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS.
RETAIN THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
AND DATA RIGHTS AND INCLUDE THIS OPTION (NOT-TO-EXCEED)
IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
DO NOT ALLOW EITHER CONTRACTOR TO ENTER THE PRODUCTION
PHASE UNTIL BOTH SOURCES ARE QUALIFIED (TECHEVAL AND OPEVAL)
IMPLEMENT PARALLEL PILOT PRODUCTION BEFORE PLACING
COMPETITIVE PRODUCTION CONTRACTS.
IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON THE PRODUCT
BASELINE DURING THE FSD AND PRODUCTION PHASES.





D 3 DIRECTED LICENSING
INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT COMPETITION.
PERFORM A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE PLACING FSD CONTRACT TO FULLY
UNDERSTAND LEGAL CLAIMS OF DEVELOPER.
DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR THE MANDATING OF DIRECTED LICENSING.
PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS
TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PRACTICABLE.
RETAIN THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
AND DATA RIGHTS (NOT-TO-EXCEED) AND INCLUDE THIS OPTION
IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO PERFORM PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS
.
PROCURE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON THE PRODUCT BASELINE
DURING THE PRODUCTION PHASE.






INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MOTIVATE LEADER AND DEVELOP
FOLLOWER.
PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF THE FOLLOWER SOURCE
AS PART OF FSD CONTRACT.
DEVELOP CONTRACT INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE THE LEADER TO
ASSIST IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION
CAPABILITY TO THE FOLLOWER.
PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND
DATA RIGHTS (NOT-TO-EXCEED) AND INCLUDE IN SOURCE
SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON THE PRODUCE BASELINE
DURING THE PRODUCTION PHASE.





D" PERFORMANCE SPEC/MODEL/AVAILABLE DATA3
APPLICATIO IDELINES
INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT PRODUCTION COMPETITION
PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
DEVELOP SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE SELECTION
OF A COMPETITIVE SOURCE THAT HAS SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY
TO PERFORM REVERSE ENGINEERING AND EFFICIENT MANUFACTURING.
PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS.
PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND DATA RIGHTS IN
FSD CONTRACT.
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON TECHNICAL DATA
PACKAGE AND THE PRODUCT BASELINE DURING PRODUCTION PHASE.
PERFORM A DESK-TOP AUDIT OF THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
BEFORE USING IT AS A BASIS FOR CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS
LEVIED ON COMPETITIVE SOURCE.






D INDEPENDENTLY VALIDATED DATA PACKAGE
INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS.
PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND DATA RIGHTS AND
INCLUDE IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE ANY SPECIAL TOOLING AND TEST EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO
VALIDATE THE DATA PACKAGE AND TO ESTABLISH THE PRODUCTION
CAPABILITY AT THE COMPETITIVE SOURCE. INCLUDE IN SOURCE
SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
CONTRACT WITH THE DEVELOPING SOURCE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
DURING DATA PACKAGE VALIDATION TO RESOLVE DISCREPANCIES
IN THE DATA AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSSES.
IMPOST STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON TECHNICAL DATA
PACKAGE
.
VALIDATE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE BEFORE USING IT TO
ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE SOURCE.





D JOINT GOVERNMENT- INDUSTRY VALIDATED DATA PACKAGE
INFORM POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS.
PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND DATA RIGHTS AND
INCLUDE IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE ANY SPECIAL TOOLING AND TEST EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO
VALIDATE THE DATA PACKAGE AND TO ESTABLISH THE PRODUCTION
CAPABILITY AT THE COMPETITIVE SOURCE. INCLUDE IN SOURCE
SELECTION CRITERIA.
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY.
RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
CONTRACT WITH THE DEVELOPING SOURCE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
DURING DATA PACKAGE VALIDATION TO RESOLVE DISCREPANCIES
IN THE DATA AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES.
IMPOST STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON TECHNICAL DATA
PACKAGE
.
DEVELOP AN INTEGRATED PLAN FOR THE JOINT VALIDATION EFFORT
THAT DESCRIBES THE TASKS TO BE PERFORMED AND THE SCHEDULE/
PHASING OF THE TASKS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, THE DEVELOPER
AND THE COMPETITIVE SOURCE.
ESTABLISH SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE SELECTION
OF A COMPETITIVE SOURCE THAT HAS SUFFICIENT ENGINEERING
AND MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY TO VALIDATE THE DATA PACKAGE
AS DEFINED IN THE PLAN.
VALIDATE THE DATA PACKAGE BEFORE ESTABLISHING PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
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